e-Lecture : Evolutionary Games and Ecosystems

Taksu Cheon

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Evolutionary Games and Ecosystems (5)

Intermezzo: en Castello Sant'Angelo

What Precisely is the Process behind the Evolution of Altruism? How could it be Stable against Free Riders

In our story, we have avoided the discussion of actual mechanism with which altruism could be spread and the governmental institutions formed. And this is done so purposefully. Bulk of the literature in evolutionary games have put focus on this aspect, with numerical simulation set up to prove the emergence of altruism based on various asumptions such as "memory" "personal identification", 'kinship", "community standing", etc. These studies also put forth numerical simulations on the stability and robustness of the desired results against the appearence of "free riders" who do not observe the agreed-upon rules to benefit themselves.
It is my personal belief that we donot still have answer to this question of precise mechanism. Just by looking back our own behavior, we realize that we observe the law not becasue we calculate on spot that to be personalluy beneficial. Rather it is a result of either of habit or of indoctrination from the childhood. So I say, that as for the mechanism question,

No Answer to be found in Existing Prisoner's Dilemma Theories

At this point, herfore, it would be beneficial to leave that difficult question aside, and regard the degree of altrism as something representable by a single parameter, which evolves in time "by the collective desire of the system". We shall rather start studying the dynamics of resulting simplified model system.

In fact, there appears to be very little chance of natural emrgence of altruism in prisoner's dilemma without external input. As an illustration, let's suppose you are Cavaradossi, the painter. Even if you are not a person of special bravary, you will not sell your dear friend Angelotti, a republican state prisoner, just because of some torture. Knowing the human nature, Baron Scarpia, the Potice Chief, brings in Tosca, the sopran diva and Cavaradossi's lover, and says "I will give her pain' to him. And to her, the captor offers his release in exchange for her sexual favor. This should be called a "reversed prisoner's dilemma".

Now, if you listen to Floria Tosca sining "Vissi d'arte, vissi d'amore..", you start worrying that she is about to fall to the scheme. But her pride and mathematical rtheorem of Nash have the day, and she make the only logical choice in that situation. As a result, the sexual-harrasser Baron meats his destiny of stabbing by fruit-cutting knife (how pitiful..), Angelotti commits suicide, and cavaradossi, after his last aria "lucevan le stelle ..", gets triple shots by the the regiment. And Tosca, noble as falcon, throw herself from the top of the Sant' Angelo Castle (what an ugly building it really is!), and thus the evil Nash equilibrium assert itself in the end.
Back to the subject, something external, such as "King" or common predator might be necessary to explain the altruism in prisoner's dilemma.

Anyhow, think of the last scene of the first act of this Puccini opera! In the background of the pomp of sumptuous catholic misa, Scarpia confesses his saddistic lust, then neals to the Almighty.. This is a scene of such a perverse beauty, and I cannot help shiver every time I watch.

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